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Abstract
Jihadi terrorist organizations view their media opportunities as weapons
in their war against the West. While there is a considerable body of work
discussing the content and form of Al-Qa'ida's media, including both
their written press and video products, we have significantly less
information on what goes on behind the scenes: how the tactical
elements and strategic goals are designed and implemented to generate
these products. The paper asserts that while we still have insufficient
information on the media strategies of the Islamic State, due to the
ideological, operational and network-to-network continuity between the
two organizations, the documents shedding a light on Al-Qa'ida's press
efforts can serve as valuable resources in understanding present-day
(and maybe the future of) jihadi media as well.
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Introduction 
After analyzing the networks behind the brutal terrorist attacks that have 
taken place in Europe in recent years, it seems conclusive that the guidelines 
published in jihadi media, in these cases, tools for psychological warfare 
aimed at disseminating fear and confusing counterterrorist efforts—relayed to 
the target audience via planned media messages and social platforms.1 At this 
time, however, it is challenging to uncover the strategic purposes and tactical 
considerations underlying the media activity of the Islamic State. That is why, 
even though they are from a period preceding the declaration of the Islamic 
State, the 17 emails found during the raid on Osama bin Laden’s house in 
Abbottabad—and later made available for research purposes by the West 
Point Counter Terrorism Center (CTC)— invaluable source material. The 
letters, written partly by bin Laden, partly by various al-Qaida leaders to bin 
Laden, offer unique insight into the inner world of al-Qaida, as well as the 
media plans and thought processes of its leadership. This paper intends to 
provide a detailed analysis of these documents and assert that the ideological 
and network-to-network continuity between al-Qaida and the Islamic State 
renders analyzing the media strategies of the former a fruitful endeavor 
towards understanding the present-day media practices of the latter. 
 
A different set of documents from Iraq, also made public through the West 
Point CTC Harmony Program, provide further interesting details on these 
strategic considerations and media control operations. While these files 
originate from the decade after 9/11, they may—based on ideological and 
strategic continuity between such organizations—serve as a foundation for 
revealing the propaganda machine and soft underbelly of today’s highly active 
terrorist groups as well. Daniel Milton’s work on the media efforts of the 
Islamic State likewise “attempts to examine declassified documents captured 
from the group’s predecessors to provide a baseline understanding of its 
present-day media structure and operations.”2 
 
As the following section will discuss, there is a vast body of evidence indicating 
strong ties between al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Such an example for a 
bridge between past and present could be al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
who frequently appears in the aforementioned documents: He called for the 
latest jihad against the US and Europe in May 2018. The diversifying process 
following the Islamic State’s loss of territories and influence may lead to an 
amalgamation of the remaining al-Qaida and Islamic State forces. There are 
alternative theories that this may occur under the leadership of Hamza bin 
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Laden, as al-Zawahiri has been considered a traitor and rejected as a leader by 
many. As to why al-Qaida members and leaders are suspicious of al-Zawahiri, 
Ali Soufan mentions a rather enigmatic episode of his life in his book, 
Anatomy of Terror. Soufan reveals the complexity of networks and spheres of 
interest at play: At the end of 1996, al-Zawahiri, a veteran of the Afghan jihad, 
who had also fought alongside both bin Laden and Sheikh Rahman, traveled 
to Azerbaijan. From there, he entered Russia in a small van, carrying 6400 
USD, accompanied by two operatives of the local cell of his organization (the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and a Chechen fixer. They pretended to be merchants, 
but since they had no personal documents, the Russian security services 
stopped them. He was sentenced to six months, but he was released after five 
with time served. He returned to Afghanistan and managed to contact the 
members of the Chechen jihad. There is no further information regarding any 
potential breakthroughs that the Russian services may have had with him, and 
the court's leniency remains likewise unexplained. The relevant facts may be 
hidden somewhere in Russian documents.3 
 
Continuity Between al-Qaida and the Islamic State 
 
While this may not be common knowledge, the perpetrators of the recent 
European attacks had complex personal relations with major European al-
Qaida figures who provided them with considerable ideological and logistical 
support. While the majority of these attacks are attributed to the Islamic State, 
many of the assailants often collaborated on preparing these atrocities with al-
Qaida members. The perpetrators of the Paris and Brussels attacks with the 
strongest ties to veteran al-Qaida fighters, ideologists, and recruiters also 
played a key role in the Francophone network of the Islamic State. Such 
connections, sometimes spanning as long as decades, are also identifiable in 
the case of radical cells and communities in Germany and the UK.4  
 
Following are a few typical examples. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the ringleader of 
the European attacks; Najim Laachroui, architect and bomb maker of the 
Paris massacre and suicide bomber of the Brussels Airport; as well as Chakib 
Akrouh, the Saint-Denis suicide bomber, had all been in close contact with 
Khalid Zerkani, a radical veteran of the Afghan jihad long before the Paris and 
Brussels assaults. Members of Zerkani’s cell had met each other in al-Qaida 
training camps in Afghanistan and the group’s operative cells in North Africa.  
 
After they participated in terrorist attacks in 1999 and the early 2000s, they 
had a significant role – one and a half decades later – in radicalizing and 
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recruiting a generation with strong ties to the Islamic State – the generation of 
the Paris and Brussels terrorists, for instance. Zerkani used Turkish human 
traffickers to transport foreign fighters to Syria, for which he was arrested in 
February 2014. The Molenbeek district in Brussels also hosted Fatima 
Aberkan, who joined the jihadi movement in 2007. She operated a recruiting 
and travel network until her 2015 arrest. Within the network, she was known 
as “the Mother of Jihad.” Her brother was convicted in 2003 for participating 
in the assassination of Iraqi military leader Massoud. Salah Abdeslam – the 
logistics coordinator of the Paris attacks – had family ties to the Aberkan 
family.  
 
Another person of interest with Moroccan background, Molenbeek resident 
Gelel Attar from Zerkani’s circle, travelled to Syria with Akrouh in 2012 (for 
the first time). The main suspect of the thwarted 2016 Paris attack, Reda 
Kriket, financier of the Zerkani cell, also had strong ties to Akrouh and 
Abaaoud. Yoni Patrick Mayne, also from Zerkani’s network, travelled to Syria 
in January 2014 with Abaaoud. Charlie Hebdo attacker Cherif Kouachi and 
Amedy Coulibaly, the perpetrator of a deadly assault on a Paris supermarket, 
were collaborating with al-Qaida Salim Benghalem, the other ringleader of the 
European attacks, on the preparations for breaking a jihadi extremist out of 
prison as early as 2010 – years before the terrorist attacks in Paris.  
 
In 2011, the two accompanied Benghalem to Yemen, where they served beside 
al-Qaida commander Anwar al-Awlaki. Kouachi and Coulibaly were also 
preparing for an operation with Djamel Beghal, who had been one of the key 
figures of al-Qaida in Europe as well as the organization’s contact person to 
fundamentalist groups in Britain from 1997. He was also responsible for the 
2001 attack against the US Embassy in Paris. (Together with 450 other 
radicals, Beghal will be released from French prisons by 2019.5)  
 
In Aleppo, Salim Benghalem tortured and executed Western prisoners with 
Mehdi Nemmouche, who attacked the Brussels Jewish Museum years later, in 
May 2014. Islamist veteran Fabien Clain was arrested in 2009 for preparing 
an assault on the Bataclan theatre: He may have been responsible for choosing 
it as a target six years later. Fabian Clain worked together with Abaaoud at the 
external operations command in Raqqa. Yet another example for these 
overlapping networks is one of the perpetrators and organizers of the 2017 
Barcelona attacks, Abdelbaki Es Satty, who established close contact with 
Moroccan al-Qaida fighter Rachid Aglif, one of the 2004 Madrid train 
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bombers, in prison in 2012, and stayed in Belgium (in Molenbeek) for months 
in 2016.6 
 
These overlapping networks and ties between al-Qaida and the Islamic State 
survived the infighting and differences in character between the two 
organizations. Similarly, in a recent presentation, Brian Fishman proposed, 
“starting the clock” on the Islamic State in October 2006 instead of the more 
commonly cited 2014.7 The continuity is also noticeable in the structural 
similarities between the networks of al-Qaida and the Islamic State, while – 
for example – the international network run by Carlos in the 1970s and 80s 
from Budapest shows marked differences from both.8 
 
Behind the Scenes: Al-Qaida Media Strategies 
 
There is a wealth of studies enumerating jihadi media forums, analyzing the 
text and visual content of various jihadi media platforms (such as Inspire, 
Dabiq, or Rumijah) and discussing their goals (such as propaganda, 
recruitment, intimidation, or training). Meanwhile, we know significantly less 
about the process, concept, and internal logic of planning and creating that 
media. Daniel Milton’s observation about this discourse, that it “mainly relies 
on what the group creates for external publication” and it “has been unable to 
answer questions regarding the structure, policies, and management of the 
group’s media arm,”9 rings just as true for the media efforts of al-Qaida as it 
does for those of the Islamic State. 
 
The endeavor to uncover such al-Qaida media strategies found valuable – if 
not entirely exhaustive – resources in the documents discovered in bin 
Laden’s Abbottabad safe house. These letters have undergone primary 
analysis at the hands of West Point CTC experts – from aspects different from 
the one that this study will attempt to present. Their work resulted in papers 
such as Liam Collins’s discussion of bin Laden’s security measures10 or a 
comprehensive study by N. Lahoud et al. of the letters in terms of how they 
illustrate the conflicts between bin Laden and the regional al-Qaida branches 
and the leadership’s attitude towards the events of the Arab Spring.11 Their 
observations also bear relevance to the analysis of media strategies. Yet 
examining the letters through this particular lens may shed further light on al-
Qaida media operations. 
 
It is clear that bin Laden wanted centralized media above all: Not only because 
he saw a coherent and authentic media strategy as a key weapon in the fight 
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against the West, but also because he thought that keeping all branches of the 
media in one hand might help rein in the splinter groups that were fighting on 
their own. As Lahoud et al. point out,  
 
“Bin Laden was not even inspired by Inspire, AQAP’s [al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula] English-language magazine designed to appeal to 
Muslim Americans to launch random attacks in the United States (...) 
In view of the recent marketing of ‘lone wolf’ operations as ‘New Age’ 
jihad, bin Laden instead urged methodical planning of suicide 
operations.”12 
 
Naturally, the integration of media strategy into the greater scheme of political 
strategy restricts the options for practical and tactical considerations. In a 
letter to “Shaykh Mahmoud” (Atiyyah Abd Al-Rahman), bin Laden presents 
the main directives as “expanding the programmed and directed media, and 
our efforts in directing the nation’s research and deciding on a specific plan 
that we all discuss.” He notes that:  
 
“the oncoming stage is important and very dangerous and does not 
tolerate the apparent differences in our directives, [adding,] due to our 
efforts in plugging that gap and preparing a plan to guide the nation, 
we must mobilize all the resources that have expressive abilities in 
speech, poetry, visual, or audio and devote them completely toward 
directing and guiding the nation’s youth.”13  
 
Another letter, written to AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi (or “Abu Basir”) by 
an unidentified author (according to the CTC, the most likely candidates are 
Osama bin Laden and/or Atiyyah), uses a rather vivid metaphor to summarize 
its strategic concept:  
 
“The enemy can also be described as a wicked tree. The trunk of that 
tree is 50cm wide. The tree has many branches, which vary in length 
and size. The trunk of the tree represents America. The branches of the 
tree represent countries, like NATO members, and countries in the 
Arab World. We, on the other hand, represent a person who wants to 
cut down that tree. Our abilities and resources, however, are limited, 
thus we cannot do the job quickly enough. The only option we are left 
with is to slowly cut that tree down by using a saw….We want to saw the 
trunk until the wicked tree is down. God willing, once the tree is down, 
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its branches will die thereof…Their tree fell down, then its branches 
died out, from South Yemen to Eastern Europe.”14 
 
Atiyyah Abd Al-Rahman was a veteran jihadi who, while not bearing any 
official rank or status, gained his influence in the organization from being a 
close friend and confidant to bin Laden. He joined al-Qaida in 2007 as a 
member of the Lybian Islamic Fighting Group and fielded a small, ragtag 
private army in Waziristan. He was bin Laden’s main contact to various 
branches, distant fighting factions and the operations center. Ten years after 
9/11, bin Laden still entrusted him with choosing the operatives and their 
coordinator for a planned terrorist attack on the United States, asking him to 
“nominate a qualified brother to be in charge of a large operation in 
America.”15 He also relied on Atiyyah in recruitment decisions, requesting “the 
résumé of all the brothers who might be nominated for high administrative 
positions now or in the future.”16 
 
What is noticeable and remarkable at first sight is how the majority of these 
letters – unlike the hate-filled articles and brutal videos aimed at the “general 
public” – discuss, in practical and unemotional terms, the “force fields” of 
effect and counter effect, and the enemy’s foreseeable response to each 
planned press release. As the letter on al-Qaida strategy warns, “All public 
announcements must be carefully evaluated. When issuing a public 
announcement, ask the question of what sort of positive or negative impact 
this announcement will generate for us?”17 
 
Behind the spectacular and revolting scenes, the organization’s media 
activity—its content, message, and tools—were meticulously and 
professionally planned. To illustrate this, in a letter discussing media strategy, 
American-born al-Qaida spokesperson Adam Gadahn openly and lengthily 
criticizes “Shaykh Ayman” (al-Zawahiri) for a statement directed at the US, 
where the Shaykh refers to Benjamin Franklin as “a previous president of 
yours.” Gadahn further explains,  
 
“We should remind that (Benjamin Franklin) was not a president, but a 
‘statesman’…I do not know the source of the story, or its popularity 
amongst the Americans. But such a mistake may be used to slander the 
Shaykh and accuse him of talking about something he does not master 
(politics).….Although plenty of the Americans may also think that 
(Franklin) a president…but this mistake is not usually committed by 
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those talking in politics, analyzing and discussing. It is a common 
mistake among general people and not between specialists.”18 
 
The media coordinators also paid special attention to timing these media 
appearances. Bin Laden considered miscalculated propaganda timing a 
mistake and a sign of amateurism. “It is extremely important to pay close 
attention to timing,” an unidentified strategist wrote. “Timing is everything. 
This saying has been proven to be true now and then.” 19 On one occasion, bin 
Laden sharply criticized a coordinator for publishing a press communiqué 
demanding the release of a jihadi prisoner incarcerated for financing 
terrorism. While he agreed with the content, he considered the timing 
counterproductive: As the issuing of the press communiqué coincided with the 
Gaza flotilla raid, it had the potential for distracting readers from the 
Palestinian operation against Israel. 
 
Al-Qaida’s Efforts to Create a Centralized Media 
 
In 2002, the first issue of the Characteristics of Jihad Magazine is published. 
Al-Zawahiri sets the tone in his introduction. “This magazine is being 
published during a time when there is a worldwide conspiracy against Jihad,” 
he writes. The first issue covers three main areas of interest: Religious topics, 
the proper rituals surrounding suicide bombings, and questions of morality 
and behavior. The magazine is accompanied by a cover letter, in which the 
author, the editor-in-chief of the quarterly, expresses his hopes that the 
recipient, Abu-Muhammad will write the editorial and support the publication 
both financially and content-wise. He requests, “the names of the authors so 
that we may use the same names in future articles.”20 It is clear, however, that 
the editor doubts his own judgement regarding the articles and – probably 
wary of the consequences of a possible mistake – suggests setting up a 
censorship body, a “religious committee” of sorts. The strategic purposes of 
launching the magazine are also clearly defined: “Regarding the platform of 
the group,” the editor explains, “until now and as far as we know, the group 
has no clear platform through which it can be recognized by the people.”21 He 
adds that:  
 
“there is no consensus with regards the [group’s] publications; on the 
contrary, there is much criticism of those publications. We need a clear 
platform that communicates to the people the group’s positions with 
regards to belief and ideology. We need this platform so that the 
members of the group may agree on rules that everyone must follow, or 
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at least rules that can be adopted by the group….Had we heeded their 
call then, we would have been close to completing this task by now. I’d 
like to remind [you] of something that I have mentioned in the past: 
even if it is a long-term goal, working to establish a religious committee 
is a very important matter that helps us avoid becoming victims of an 
individual’s changes in opinions. In order to avoid any disagreement, it 
is possible to have Islamic scholars review any platform we write.”22 
 
In 2006, however, the practice of such improvised solutions and individual 
projects came to a halt. In autumn, al-Zarqawi and the leadership of AQI (Al-
Qaida in Iraq) established a center supervising all media activities, the Al-
Furqan Institute for Media Production, which miraculously survived every 
reorganization and diversification effort, and eventually even produced 
propaganda material – including execution and beheading videos – for the 
Islamic State. Abu Muhammad al-Furqan became the first minister of 
information and a key media coordinator for the IS until he was killed by an 
air raid on 7 September 2016 in Raqqa. 
 
From 2006, the Institute was hard at work on setting up an operational 
model. “It has to be said that media has a big effect on managing a war, it is 
one of those weapons that we cannot do without during the war against the 
Crusaders,” a letter from the Al-Furqan Media asserts.23 “Nowadays, everyone 
is aware of the media importance, so in order not to repeat the same mistakes 
of the past, we have decided to set up this structure to institute a media 
process in the state,” boasts a March 2007 document, which the author, 
supposedly mesmerized by organized propaganda, introduced with a poem 
about the importance of media (unfortunately missing from the English 
translation).24 
 
This great enthusiasm also shows in how, under the umbrella of centralized 
coordination, a bout of diversification commences: Publishers, magazines, 
and websites proliferate at an unprecedented rate. In his study, Philip Seib 
lists the freshly launched or refurbished media outlets.25 By 2008, al-Qaida 
was running 4000 websites. The group’s production company, As-Sahab, set 
up in 1988 by bin Laden, released 16 videos in 2005, 58 in 2006 and more 
than 90 in 2007; all the while monitoring – not unlike a Hollywood studio – 
what the audience may find appealing. The so-called “Jihad Academy” incited 
fighters with images of attacks and suicide bombings. Even Al-Zarqawi made a 
propaganda video of himself personally beheading US businessman Nicholas 
Berg in 2004 in Iraq. The video was downloaded half a million times in a 
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single day. Another online magazine, Camp of the Sword focused mainly on 
training fighters, claiming that their self-study program – including 
intelligence gathering and wiretapping techniques – required no boot camp 
visit. 
 
Internal Rules for Introducing Suicide Bombers 
 
Jihadi media strategists also designed a “script” for presenting suicide 
bombings. Formally, they suggest that “the will reading should be about 5-7 
minutes long” and that “the uniform should be black clothes and there should 
be no background and they should have plenty of weapons beside them.” They 
advise the person filming “the suicide brother” to be aware of the following:  
 
“The chosen words relayed to our suicide brothers, whether it is advice 
or similar should be kind words. But we have seen that some need 
direction and we are accused of being warriors and not respecting 
scholars as we think that we are highly intellectual and superior 
compared to others and we have been descried by many as rude. 
Regardless of whether we have been misjudged – we plead our case to 
God-we are not going to question our virtuous brothers – but our duty 
is not to hallow these thoughts but to concentrate on compassionate 
words….When you are taking pictures of a martyr, please adhere to the 
following: Pay close attention to most of the words chosen by the 
martyr brothers about guardianship etc. and make sure they say good 
things, but we have seen some where they are not paying attention and 
they need direction because we are being accused of being mujahidin 
by not honoring the leaders and we are accused of spreading religious 
persecution and acting superior to the people and we are described as 
alienating and described as having bad morals and no doubt 
overlooking the extent of that for our injustice – May God take care of 
the Complainers – we do not doubt the words of the pure brothers – we 
heed them and god heeds them – our duty is not to ignore these 
suspicions” 
 
The text, although in places slightly confusing, is remarkable because—instead 
of the suicide bombers, whose mental and psychological state has been 
thoroughly analyzed—it provides insight into the mentality of the person 
behind the bomber: The one who, despite considering the attack a sacred 
mission, orders someone else to carry it out. Suicide attackers tended to be 
outsiders, foreign fighters, not members of the AQI or the ISI top brass. This 
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must have struck much of the target audience (of mobilize Muslims) as 
dishonorable and thus forced jihadi media to rhetorically challenge the widely 
held belief that their leaders consider themselves superior and heartlessly 
send suicide bombers to their death. 
 
Another document presents an entire “scenario” of recommendations: Specific 
content to be included in the videos introducing the suicide bombers (each 
point complemented with the phrase “May God rest his soul”). The 
recommended talking points include questions such as “Introductions to his 
life—May God rest his soul—his upbringings and mentions of his quality. The 
beginning of his Jihad where and when?” or “How did he organize the attack 
group before and after the fall of the regime?” and “The pledge to Sheik 
Usama and how did you announce it.”26 
 
On 10 December 2009, there was a session of the High Command for Jihad 
and Liberation Media and Recruitment Department with representatives from 
various governorates’ “media platoons.” The “top secret” minutes of the long-
winded, meticulous committee meeting provide detailed insight into the flow 
of conversation. The attendees took their time to mull over issues such as 
media work related security measures, risks of using email and mobile, or the 
details of work coordination. Their primary mission was clarified by a 
comment from Deputy Commander Doctor Kamal al-Din al-Naqshabandi, 
who asserts, “in the media field we still suffer and we still fall behind because 
of media blockades imposed against us. Because of that we must build a media 
base….First to official and public national media…and then worldwide media 
outlets.”27  
 
Media Campaign on the 10th Anniversary of 9/11: Centralized 
Media at Work 
 
Some letters found in Abbottabad deserve particularly thorough analysis given 
that the highlighted strategic and tactical dilemmas and considerations have 
far-reaching implications. In his 10 October 2010 letter to Shaykh Mahmoud, 
bin Laden outlines his ideas concerning the anniversary. His observations and 
suggestions are answered a few months later in a letter to an unknown 
recipient by California-born al-Qaida spokesman Adam Gadahn. 
 
“We need to benefit from this event and get our messages to the Muslims and 
celebrate the victory that they achieved,” bin Laden observes about the 
political goal of the campaign. “We need to restore their confidence in their 
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nation and motivate them. We should also present our just cause to the world, 
especially to the European people.”28 In his analysis, the timing of the 
propaganda is fortuitous with regard to the grand scheme of politics. “Anyone 
who looks at the enemies in NATO, especially America, will know that they are 
in big trouble,” he observes.  
 
“This year has been the worst year for them in Afghanistan since they 
invaded it. The number of their dead has never been this high 
according to their own reports. Their financial crisis continues. Britain 
has lowered i[t]s defense budget and America is reducing the budget of 
the Pentagon. Anyone who knows the world and knows politics, knows 
that it is impossible for them to continue with the war. There is no 
difference between them and the Soviet Union before it withdrew from 
Afghanistan.”29 
 
Yet, it is Adam Gadahn who transforms bin Laden’s concept of the campaign 
into strategy and elaborates the details. “As for the benefit of exposing the 
Shaykh at this stage, we should look at this matter from all angles,” he 
emphasizes, since bin Laden has not made a large-scale media appearance for 
almost ten years at this point.30 Gadahn finds “the 10th anniversary of the 
attacks of Manhattan and Washington” (or, as he also calls it, the “Manhattan 
battle”) a suitable occasion.  
 
“Every exposure of him,” he adds, “as long as it is not daily or semi- 
weekly, should have an influence. The repetition of his exposure, 
irrespective of the vicious campaign that is waged against al-Qaida, 
everywhere, is by itself something that attracts attention.”31  
 
He also believes that the timing is especially suitable, because the US is 
preoccupied with economic hardships. As he points out,  
 
“[at] the press conference held by Obama after the midterm elections, 
all the questions were on the bad economy, and the means to get out of 
the crisis. Nevertheless, not one of the journalists dared to embarrass 
Obama by questioning him about the influence on the American budget 
and the national economy of spending the billions yearly on the two 
wars of Afghanistan and Iraq.”32 
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Finding Channels and Contacts for al-Qaida’s Messages 
 
In his letter, bin Laden also wonders which forums and channels would be 
suitable for broadcasting the planned al-Qaida media appearances. He seeks 
suggestions and explains his selection criteria. 
 
“We should also look for an American channel that can be close to 
being unbiased,” he writes, “such as CBS, or other channel that has 
political motives that make it interested in broadcasting the point of 
view of al-Mujahidin.”  
 
He also suggests enlisting the journalists, some of whom are reliable 
supporters of al-Qaida, noting that the recipient  
 
“should write to ‘Abd-al-Bari ‘Atwan and Robert Fisk and tell them that 
the tenth anniversary is coming and it is the harvest of a fierce war 
between al-Mujahidin and America. This is a chance to explain our 
motives for continuing the war….Tell them that we suggest that they 
make a documentary on this anniversary and we will provide them with 
printed, audio, and video materials.” Bin Laden’s peculiar connection to 
these journalists becomes clear when he advises his followers to “have 
them give us their video material and the names of specialists that they 
will use in order for us to establish a vision for the film and to be able to 
clarify the events.” 
 
In response to bin Laden’s proposition, Gadahn asserts that there is no real 
difference between American television channels and other media outlets in 
terms of professionalism or bias. Nevertheless, he reviews the options. He 
excludes Fox News as the least professional and most biased broadcaster, 
writing, “let her die in her anger.” He believes that although CNN closely 
cooperates with the government, the Arabic version of the channel provides 
detailed reporting with faithful quotations. He complains about less biased 
MSNBC firing its two journalists for controversial statements. “ABC channel is 
all right,” he writes, “actually it could be one of the best channels, as far as we 
are concerned.” They – especially terrorism specialist Brian Ross – are 
interested in al-Qaida, and they are proud of their interviews that they had 
made with the Shaykh. “It also broadcasted excerpts from a speech of mine on 
the fourth anniversary,” Gadahn adds, “It also published most of that text on 
its site on the internet.” 
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Gadahn believes that the media department should distribute the material “to 
more than one channel, so that there will be healthy competition between the 
channels in broadcasting the material.” His suggestions for the distribution 
method may also serve as a model for al-Qaida’s general media strategy. He 
proposes that they send the material to 30-50 writers, experts, and 
independent journalists from various countries who are interested in al-Qaida 
and compiles the lengthy list of names. He, too, puts Robert Fisk at the head 
of the list.  
 
“We would inform each,” he explains, “that he has been chosen to be 
amongst a group of international journalists and writers, and that they 
will receive special media material on the tenth anniversary of 
9/11.….There would be a password and a site address to download the 
materials at the right time, let it be 5 days before the anniversary, for 
example. This is easy -as I think- on our brothers working in the 
networking.”  
 
According to Gadahn, even if only one-third of the journalists show interest, 
“we would have 10 international journalists that will display our mission in 
the newspapers and channels. If the experiment works,” he adds, “then I 
suggest to repeat it on every important occasion.” 
 
Target Groups for the Campaign Messages 
 
Gadahn also specifies the target groups of the media campaign. He places 
special emphasis on the European nations, just as bin Laden did in his earlier 
messages. The media department would also like to address the entire Muslim 
world. The key strategic goal of shaking up and igniting the Muslim countries 
would soon be accomplished in the chaotic revolutions of the Arab Spring. 
 
Jihadi forums, however, present Gadahn with an almost insurmountable 
problem, rendering winning the hearts of people – one of his key endeavors—
a tough nut. Most of the Muslims find these forums “repulsive” or 
inaccessible. He believes that they “distort the face of al-Qaida, due to what 
you know of bigotry, the sharp tone that characterizes most of the participants 
in these forums.” 
 
Gadahn mentions a third target group. “We should also not forget the 
Mujahidin brothers in the fronts,” he writes, “who are passing through crucial 
times and facing disaster after disaster.” They, however, should be addressed 
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through video messages, because “many people do not read, and even if they 
read, they are more influenced by visuals.” 
 
Visuality is also strongly featured in the documents from Iraq; for instance, in 
the above-mentioned minutes of the secret the Media and Recruitment 
Department meeting, where the participants instructed all their commanders: 
 
“to document every Jihadist operations and said that it is unacceptable 
to the Supreme Commander to not take quality photographs of 
operations. And that a photographed operation is equal to 100 
operations that were not photographed.” 
 
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a common tactical element in hybrid 
warfare. Yet, in our modern era of “grey zones,” the “enemy of my enemy” 
mechanism is no longer a safe point of reference in the intricate global system 
of asymmetric warfare. The virtual front lines move around quickly, alliances 
are malleable, and the geopolitical actors are connected to each other through 
a multiplicity of hidden agendas. Even though this method of waging war is 
usually attributed to states or secret services, al-Qaida—and probably the 
leadership of the Islamic State, too—have evidently been using it in a 
conscious and efficient way.  
 
Gadahn, for example, was preoccupied with the hostility between Jews and 
Christians or the antagonism of Catholics and Protestants as a friction on 
which subversive and recruiting activities could be built. He viewed Middle 
Eastern Christians and Catholics in general as a susceptible group who may be 
opposed to Jews and Protestants enough to be more open to Islam. Therefore, 
he criticized the attack on the Baghdad Catholic church, claiming that it “does 
not help us convey the message.” This, on the other hand, was difficult for 
their own fighters and ideologists to accept. Gadahn struck a chord that may 
have mitigated the expected outrage:  
 
“How beautiful what Shaykh Usama mentioned lately -when talking 
about a media speech- that the strong statements that were mentioned 
by the ancestors were said during days of dignity and control, and 
therefore it is not fitting to the era of vulnerability….So it cannot be 
implemented on the days of weakness like our present days.”  
 
He mentioned destroying churches and “devious religious books” as an 
example. Yet he also felt right to discuss – probably because he could sense 
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the weakness of his argument—“the animosity of the Pope and other church 
heads to Islam and Muslims.” 33 When al-Qaida leaders fantasize about the 
possibility of an alliance with Catholics against Jews and Protestants, they are 
unaware of their limitations—probably due to their lack of knowledge 
regarding the Jewish-Christian roots of European culture and—largely—to 
their arrogance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In his study on al-Qaida’s media efforts, Philip Seib asserts, “Al-Qaeda has 
become a significant player in global politics largely because it has developed a 
sophisticated media strategy.”34 This body of research is intended as an 
analysis of that sophisticated media strategy and tactical planning, which has, 
in my view, received less scientific attention lately than the media products 
themselves. As the resources may have indicated, observing the way of 
thinking revealed by these documents could—especially considering the 
ideological and network-to-network continuity between jihadi terrorist 
organizations – provide valuable pointers for analysing present-day jihadi 
propaganda and the psychological warfare waged through media practices. 
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